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 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 12-1397 
 ___________ 
 
 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
GEORGE W. CRUTE, III, 
        Appellant 
____________________________________ 
 
 On Appeal from the United States District Court 
 for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
 (D.C. Crim. No. 05-cr-00100-001) 
 District Judge:  Honorable Gary L. Lancaster 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted for Possible Summary Action  
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
May 31, 2012 
 Before:  SLOVITER, FISHER and WEIS, Circuit Judges  
(Opinion filed: June 8, 2012) 
 _________ 
 
 OPINION 
 _________ 
 
PER CURIAM. 
 George W. Crute, III, appeals pro se from the order of the District Court denying 
his motion for a reduction in sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).  We will affirm. 
I. 
 In 2006, Crute was convicted of two counts of possessing with the intent to 
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distribute more than five grams of crack cocaine in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).  
Because Crute had been convicted of a previous felony drug offense, the mandatory 
minimum statutory sentence at the time of his sentencing was ten years of imprisonment.  
See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B) (2006 version).  The District Court imposed that mandatory 
minimum and sentenced Crute to ten years of imprisonment on each count to run 
concurrently.  We affirmed.  See United States v. Crute, 238 F. App’x 903, 904 (3d Cir. 
2007). 
 Thereafter, the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010 (“FSA”) became law on August 3, 
2010.  See United States v. Dixon, 648 F.3d 195, 197 (3d Cir. 2011).  In relevant part, the 
FSA increased the amount of crack cocaine necessary to trigger a mandatory minimum 
sentence under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B) from five grams to twenty-eight grams.  See 
Dixon, 648 F.3d at 197.  The FSA also authorized the United States Sentencing 
Commission to amend the Sentencing Guidelines to conform with the FSA, which the 
Commission did effective November 1, 2010.  See id. at 197-98.  The Commission later 
made Amendment 750, which revised the Guidelines drug quantity tables in accordance 
with the FSA, retroactive effective November 1, 2011.  See United States v. Curet, 670 
F.3d 296, 309 (1st Cir. 2012) (citing U.S.S.G. § 1B1.10(c)), petition for cert. filed, — 
U.S.L.W. —, (U.S. May 1, 2012) (No. 11-10123). 
 Crute then filed pro se the § 3582(c)(2) motion at issue here on the basis of the 
retroactive FSA-related Guidelines amendments and the FSA itself.  The District Court 
appointed counsel for that purpose but, for reasons not apparent from the record, Crute 
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continued to file papers in support of his motion pro se.  The District Court denied the 
motion on the ground that the FSA does not retroactively apply to Crute’s sentence 
because he was sentenced before its effective date.  Crute appeals pro se.
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II. 
 In his § 3582(c)(2) motion, Crute mentioned the FSA-related Guidelines 
amendments and purported to seek relief on the reduction of a Guidelines sentencing 
range applicable to him.  His only actual argument in this regard, however, was that the 
FSA itself should apply retroactively to relieve him of his statutory minimum sentence.
2
  
The District Court determined that the FSA does not apply retroactively to Crute.  
Assuming without deciding that § 3582(c)(2) permits a claim based on the FSA itself as 
opposed to its related Guidelines amendments,
3
 the District Court was right. 
                                                 
1
  We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  The Government initially argued below, 
without citation to authority, that the District Court lacked “jurisdiction” over Crute’s 
motion in light of a previous § 3582(c)(2) motion he filed.  Crute, however, filed his 
previous motion on the basis of a different Guidelines amendment before the FSA 
became law.  In any event, we perceive no jurisdictional impediment to the District 
Court’s ability to address his second motion on the merits, or to ours.  We exercise 
plenary review over legal issues raised on a § 3582(c)(2) motion.  See United States v. 
Doe, 564 F.3d 305, 307 n.2 (3d Cir. 2009). 
 
2
  Crute also argued that, on resentencing, the District Court should favorably consider his 
post-conviction rehabilitation in applying the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).  
The District Court did not reach that argument and, because we agree that Crute was not 
eligible for resentencing in the first place, we do not reach it either. 
 
3
  The statute permits district courts to reduce a defendant’s sentence when the defendant 
“has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment based on a sentencing range that has 
subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 
994(o) . . . if such a reduction is consistent with applicable policy statements issued by 
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 As Crute acknowledges on appeal, we and every other Court of Appeals to have 
addressed the issue have held that the FSA does not apply retroactively to defendants, 
like Crute, who were sentenced before its effective date.  See United States v. Reevey, 
631 F.3d 110, 114-15 (3d Cir. 2010).  We later held that the FSA is applicable to 
defendants who committed their crimes before its effective date but who, unlike Crute,  
were sentenced only thereafter.  See Dixon, 648 F.3d at 203.  We also explained in that 
case that the Sentencing Commission’s decision to make the FSA-related Guidelines 
amendments retroactive “does not affect the statutory mandatory minimums” that were 
amended by the FSA itself.  Id. at 198 n.1; see also Doe, 564 F.3d at 312 (holding that a 
defendant is not eligible for a reduction under § 3582(c)(2) when the sentence is the 
product of a mandatory statutory minimum).  Thus, under the controlling law of this 
Circuit, neither the FSA itself nor the Sentencing Guidelines amendments promulgated 
thereunder entitle Crute to a reduction in his mandatory minimum sentence. 
 Perhaps recognizing as much, Crute argues on appeal that Reevey “is no longer 
good law” because the Sentencing Commission later made its FSA-related amendments 
retroactive and its decision to do so makes the FSA itself retroactive as well.  Crute cites 
no authority for that proposition, and we have located none.  To the contrary, the only 
Court of Appeals to have addressed it precedentially has rightly rejected it as “illogical.”  
Curet, 670 F.3d at 309.  As that court explained, the Sentencing Commission’s authority 
                                                                                                                                                             
the Sentencing Commission.”  18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2).  This language contemplates only 
certain challenges based on amendments to the Guidelines, not on legislation.  We need 
not decide the issue, however, because Crute’s claim clearly lacks merit. 
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to make Guidelines amendments retroactive does not extend to statutes, and the 
Commission expressly stated in making its FSA-related amendments retroactive that they 
do not make retroactive the FSA itself.  See id. at 309-10 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 994(u) and 
76 Fed. Reg. at 41,333). 
 Crute also notes that the United States Supreme Court has granted certiorari to 
address whether (as we later held in Dixon) the FSA applies to defendants who 
committed their crimes before its effective date but who, unlike Crute, were sentenced 
only thereafter.  See United States v. Fisher, 635 F.3d 336 (7th Cir. 2011), cert. granted 
sub nom., Dorsey v. United States, 132 S. Ct. 759 (Nov. 28, 2011) (No. 11-5683); United 
States v. Hill, 417 F. App’x 560 (7th Cir. 2011), cert. granted, 132 S. Ct. 759 (Nov. 28, 
2011) (No. 11-5721).  Crute does not argue that we should stay this appeal pending the 
Supreme Court’s decision in those cases, however, and we see no reason to do so.  The 
issue on which the Supreme Court granted certiorari does not apply to Crute because he 
was sentenced before the FSA’s effective date.  If the Supreme Court nevertheless 
addresses the retroactivity of the FSA as to defendants in Crute’s situation, of course, 
then our ruling does not prevent Crute from seeking whatever relief may be available in 
that regard if it is otherwise proper for him to do so.  We express no opinion on those 
issues. 
 For these reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.  
 
